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Abstract
In this paper we formulate and analyze an N -player stochastic game of the classical fuel
follower problem and its Mean Field Game (MFG) counterpart. For the N -player game, we
obtain the Nash Equilibrium (NE) explicitly by deriving and analyzing a system of Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations, and by establishing the existence of a unique strong solution
to the associated Skorokhod problem on an unbounded polyhedron with an oblique reflection.
For the MFG, we derive a bang-bang type NE under some mild technical conditions and by the
viscosity solution approach. We also show that this solution is an -NE to the N -player game,
with  = O( 1√
N
). The N -player game and the MFG differ in that the NE for the former is state
dependent while the NE for the latter is threshold-type bang-bang policy where the threshold
is state independent . Our analysis shows that the NE for a stationary MFG may not be the
NE for the corresponding MFG.
1 Introduction
The classic fuel follower problem concerns controlling a single moving object on a real line whose
movement is modeled by a standard Brownian motion. The controller controls the position of her
object in a possibly non-continuous way, i.e., with singular controls. Her objective is to minimize
over an infinite-time horizon, the total amount of control and the total L2 distance of the object to
the origin, with a discount factor. The optimal control derived by Beneš, Shepp, and Witsenhausen
[4] is shown to be of a “bang-bang” type. That is, there exists a threshold c such that when the object
is within [−c, c], it will be idling; and when it is outside [−c, c], the controller will apply the minimal
push needed to bring it back within [−c, c]. The controlled dynamics is thus a reflected Brownian
motion, with local times at c and −c as a result of the minimal push. This problem has a number of
generalizations; see, for example, Karatzas [29], Karatzas and Shreve [31], and Shreve and Soner [39].
In particular, Karatzas [29] derives a similar bang-bang type optimal control when the L2 distance
is relaxed to a class of convex and symmetric functions; see Figure 1. Due to its simplicity, the
fuel follower problem has many applications and has inspired a number of research topics, including
reflected stochastic differential equations and semimartingales, Skorokhod problems, and regularities
of fully nonlinear PDEs with gradient constraints. See, for instance, Harrison and Williams [23],
Soner and Shreve [41], Varadhan and Williams [42], Williams [43], Dai and Williams [14], Kruk [33],
Atar and Budhiraja [1], Budhiraja and Ross [7], Evans [18], and Hynd [28].
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Our work. In this paper we formulate and analyze an N -player stochastic game of the fuel
follower problem and its Mean Field Game (MFG) counterpart. In the N -player game, there are
N controllers and N objects with each controller controlling one object. Each controller minimizes
her total amount of control and the total distance of her object to the center of the N objects. The
interaction among the N controllers in the game is to ensure that their own objects closely follow
each other’s movement. We derive the Nash Equilibrium (NE) explicitly (Theorem 5). This result is
established in two main steps. The first step is to derive and analyze a system of Hamilton–Jacobi–
Bellman (HJB) equations for the value functions and to establish a verification theorem (Theorem
3) for the game. After finding the solution to the HJB system, the second step is to construct a
feedback control via proving the existence of a (unique strong) solution to an associated Skorokhod
problem on an unbounded polyhedron with an oblique reflection (Theorem 4). For the special case
of N = 2, we exploit the symmetric structure to obtain multiple NEs; see Figure 4.
We then consider the corresponding MFG with N → ∞, where each controller minimizes her
total amount of control and the total distance of her object to the mean position of all objects. Our
approach to analyze this MFG is to study directly the two coupled PDEs, the backward parabolic
type HJB equation and the forward Kolmogorov equation. By further exploiting the problem
structure, we derive an NE which is of a bang-bang type (Theorem 7). The threshold of this bang-
bang type NE is state-independent as in the classical fuel follower problem. We finally discuss the
relation between the N -player game and the MFG, and show that this NE to the MFG game is an
-NE to the N -player game (Theorem 14).
Our contribution. In general, there are essential technical difficulties in analyzing N -player
stochastic games. The underlying HJB system is high dimensional, the existence of its solution is
usually hard to analyze, and deriving explicit solutions is even more challenging. Therefore it is
in general infeasible to characterize the equilibrium. In the case of the singular control, the HJB
equation is even more complex, with additional gradient constraints coming from possible jumps in
the control. For MFGs with singular controls, the Hamiltonian for the underlying stochastic control
problem diverges and the classical stochastic maximal principle fails. Moreover, due to the possible
non-stationarity of the mean information process, the associated HJB equation is parabolic despite
the infinite-time horizon setting, making it even more difficult to analyze the regularity of the value
functions or to derive explicit solutions.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to provide a complete characterization of
the NEs for both the N -player stochastic game and the MFG in a singular control setting. Our
explicit solutions are derived for a class of convex and symmetric functions, without the usual linear-
quadratic structure for MFGs with regular controls in Bardi [2], Bardi and Priuli [3], Bensoussan,
Sung, Yam, and Yung [6].
Moreover, explicit solutions derived in this paper make it possible to directly compare the
structural differences between the MFG and the N -player game. It provides useful insights not
only for analyzing general N -player games but also for proper formulations of MFGs. Indeed,
MFGs may be very different in nature from N -player games: in the fuel follower problem, the MFG
degenerates to a single-player game in the sense that its NE is threshold-type bang-bang policy
where the threshold is state independent (Proposition 11 and Proposition 12), while the NEs for
the N -player game are state dependent (Theorem 5). The collapse of the MFG to the single player
problem (Proposition 11) is a side effect by the aggregation in the MFG formulation: players become
more anticipative when they are assumed to be identical. Our analysis also shows that the NE for
a stationary MFG may not be the NE for the corresponding MFG (Remark 10.1).
There are also some noteworthy economic insights from our analysis. For instance, in the N -
2
player game, we show that when the number of players increases, it is more costly for each player to
keep track of other players before making decisions, as players will intervene more frequently due to
the increasing complexity of the game. Moreover, the bigger the discount factor α, the less frequent
players will intervene. (See Remarks 15.1 and 12.1).
Related work on stochastic games. There are a number of papers on non-zero-sum two-player
games with singular controls. By treating one as a controller and the other as a stopper, where the
controller minimizes the finite variation process and the stopper decides the optimal time to termi-
nate the game, Karatzas and Li [30] prove the existence of an NE for the game via a BSDE approach.
Hernandez-Hernandez, Simon, and Zervos [24] provide an in-depth analysis of the smoothness of the
value function and show that the optimal strategy may not be unique when the controller enjoys a
first-move advantage. Kwon and Zhang [34] investigate a game of irreversible investment with sin-
gular controls and strategic exit. They characterize a class of market perfect equilibria and identify
a set of conditions under which the outcome of the game may be unique despite the multiplicity of
the equilibria. De Angelis and Ferrari [15] establish the connection between singular controls and
optimal stopping times for a non-zero-sum two-player game. Bensoussan and Frehse [5] consider
an N -player game with regular controls and obtain the NE via the maximum principle approach.
The closest to our problem setting are those of Mannucci [37] and Hamadene and Mu [22]. They
consider the fuel follower problem in a finite-time horizon with a bounded velocity, and establish
the existence of an NE of a two-player game. The former analyzes a strongly coupled parabolic
system and the latter uses the BSDE technique.
Related work on MFGs. The theory of MFGs has enjoyed tremendous growth since the pio-
neering works of Huang, Malhamé, and Caines [27] and Lasry and Lions [36]. The MFG provides
a tractable approach to the otherwise challenging N -player stochastic games. However, except for
the general result that the NE of an MFG is an -Nash equilibrium to the N -player game (see, for
instance [27] and Cardaliaguet, Delarue, Lasry, and Lions [10] for regular controls and Guo and Joon
[20] for singular controls), there are very limited results on comparing the NE of N -player games and
MFGs. The exceptions are Carmona, Fouque, and Sun [12] for systemic risks, Nutz and Zhang [38]
for competition, Lacker and Zariphopoulou [35] for portfolio management, and [2]. All these results,
however, are with regular controls. For MFGs with singular controls, notions of relaxed stochastic
maximal principle or relaxed admissible controls have been introduced to establish the existence of
optimal controls; see, for instance, Fu and Horst [19], Hu, Øksendal, and Sulem [25], and Zhang [44].
2 N-Player Fuel Follower Game
2.1 Preliminary: Single Player
The classic fuel follower problem is as follows. Consider a probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P) with
a standard Brownian motion {Bt}t≥0. The position of the object Xt is assumed to be
Xt = x+Bt + ξ
+
t − ξ−t , X0− = x, (2.1)
where the pair of control (ξ+, ξ−) is a non-decreasing, càdlàg process. The goal of the controller is
to solve for the value function v(x) of the following optimization problem,
v(x) = inf
(ξ+,ξ−)∈U
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
[
h(Xt)dt+ dξˇt
]
, (2.2)
3
where the admissible control set U is
U := {(ξ+t , ξ−t ) | ξ+t and ξ−t are FXt−-progressively measurable, càdlàg, non-decreasing,
with E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtdξ+t
]
<∞,E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtdξ−t
]
<∞, and ξ+0− = ξ−0− = 0
}
.
Here α > 0 is a discount factor, {FXt}t≥0 is the natural filtration of {Xt}t≥0, and ξˇt = ξ+t + ξ−t
is the total accumulative amount of controls up to time t, called “fuel usage”, hence the term fuel
follower problem. In addition, under the assumption
A1: The function h : R → R is assumed to be convex, symmetric, twice differentiable, with
h(0) ≥ 0, h′′(x) decreasing on R+, and 0 < k < h′′(x) ≤ K for some constants K > k > 0,
Problem (2.2) is solved (see [4] and [29]) by analyzing the associated HJB equation
min
{
1
2
vxx(x) + h(x)− αv(x), 1− vx(x), 1 + vx(x)
}
= 0, (2.3)
where vx and vxx are the first and second order derivatives of v with respect to x, respectively. The
optimal control {ξ∗+t , ξ∗−t }t≥0 is shown to be of a bang-bang type given by
ξ∗+t = max
{
0, max
0≤u≤t
{−x−Bu + ξ∗−u − c}} ,
ξ∗−t = max
{
0, max
0≤u≤t
{
x+Bu + ξ
∗+
u − c
}}
,
where the threshold c > 0 is the unique positive solution to
1√
2α
tanh
(
c
√
2α
)
=
p
′
1(c)− 1
p
′′
1(c)
, (2.4)
with
p1(x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αth(x+Bt)dt
]
=
1√
2α
(
e−x
√
2α
∫ x
−∞
h(z)ez
√
2αdz + ex
√
2α
∫ ∞
x
h(z)e−z
√
2αdz
)
.
The corresponding value function v(x) ∈ C2(R) is given by
v(x) =

−p
′′
1 (c) cosh(x
√
2α)
2α cosh(c
√
2α)
+ p1(x), 0 ≤ x ≤ c,
v(c) + (x− c), x ≥ c,
v(−x), x < 0.
(2.5)
In other words, it is optimal for the controller to apply a “minimal” push to keep the object within
[−c, c]. Mathematically, the controlled process is a Brownian motion reflected at the boundaries c
and −c. The minimal push corresponds to the local time of the Brownian motion at c and −c. See
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Optimal control of the single player problem
2.2 N-Player Fuel Follower Game
Now suppose there are N controllers, with each controller controlling one object. For simplicity, let
us call such a pair of controller and object a “player”. The game is for each player to stay as close
as possible to other players.
This N -player game can be formulated as follows. Let
(
X1t , . . . , X
N
t
) ∈ RN be the positions of
players such that for i = 1, . . . , N ,
Xit = x
i +Bit + ξ
i,+
t − ξi,−t , (2.6)
with (X10−, · · · , XN0−) = (x1, · · · , xN ) =: x, where (B1t , . . . , BNt ) is an N -dimensional standard
Brownian motion on RN . Let m(N)t =
∑N
i=1X
i
t
N be the center of these N players at time t, with
m
(N)
0− =
∑N
i=1 x
i
N . Let h(X
i
t −m(N)t ) be the distance between player i and the center m(N)t at time
t. The goal of each player i is to minimize, over all admissible controls
(
ξ1, . . . , ξN
) ∈ SN , the
following payoff function
J i(x1, . . . , xN ; ξ1, . . . , ξN ) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−αit
[
h
(
Xit − ρm(N)t
)
dt+ dξˇit
]
, (N-player)
where ξˇi = ξi,+ + ξi,−. Here the admissible control set SN is defined as
SN :=
{
(ξ1, . . . , ξN )
∣∣∣ ξj = (ξj,+, ξj,−) ∈ U jN ,P(dξjt (x)dξit(x) > 0) = 0,
for any t > 0,x ∈ RN , i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and i 6= j} , (2.7)
with
U jN =
{
(ξj,+t , ξ
j,−
t )
∣∣∣ ξj,+t and ξj,−t are F (X1t−,...,XNt−)-progressively measurable, càdlàg, non-decreasing,
with E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αjtdξj,+t
]
<∞, E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αjtdξj,−t
]
<∞, ξj,+0− = 0, ξj,−0− = 0
}
,
where αj > 0 is the discount factor for player j and {F (X1t ,...,XNt )}t≥0 is the natural filtration of
{(X1t , . . . , XNt )}t≥0. The condition in Eqn. (2.7)
P
(
dξit(x)dξ
j
t (x) > 0
)
= 0, for any x ∈ RN , t ≥ 0, i 6= j (2.8)
is to facilitate designing feasible control policies when controls involve jumps.
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Remark 0.1. Mathematically, one may replace the running cost function h(Xit −mNt ) by h(Xit −
ρmNt + η), with ρ ≥ 0 indicating the strength of interactions among players as in [26] and [27]. We
choose to fix ρ = 1 and η = 0 for clearer model interpretations for the fuel follower problem. Indeed,
adding a scaling factor ρ and a constant η will not change the derivation of solutions except for
minor notational changes. In fact, as will be shown in Section 2.6 and Appendix A, the construction
of NEs will be simpler when ρ 6= 1.
Throughout the paper, unless otherwise specified, we will for simplicity and without loss of
generality α1 = · · · = αN = α. (See Section 5 for further sensitivity analysis with respect to α.)
2.3 Solution to the N-Player Game
There are various criteria to measure the performance of strategies in stochastic games. For instance,
Pareto Optimality (PO) and Nash Equilibrium (NE) provide two distinct views, with NE focusing
on stability and PO on efficiency. An NE framework can be further defined depending on the
admissible strategies, resulting in open-loop NEs, closed-loop NEs, and the Markovian NEs. See
Carmona [11] for more discussions on these concepts.
In this paper, we will focus on the Markovian NE, also known as the closed-loop NE with a
feedback form, specified below.
Definition 1. A tuple of admissible controls ξ∗ = (ξ1∗, . . . , ξN∗) ∈ SN is a Markovian NE of the
stochastic game (N-player), if for any i = 1, . . . , N , X 0− = x, and any (ξ−i∗, ξi) ∈ SN , the
following inequality holds,
J i (x;ξ∗) ≤ J i (x; (ξ−i∗, ξi)) .
Here strategies ξi∗ and ξi are deterministic functions of time t and X t = (X1t , . . . , XNt ), with the
notation (x−i, yi) := (x1, · · · , xi−1, yi, xi+1, · · · , xN ) for any x ∈ RN . J i (x;ξ∗) is called the NE
value associated with ξ∗.
2.4 NE Solutions
The NE solution will be derived in two steps. The first is to derive and analyze the associated HJB
system. A verification theorem which provides sufficient conditions for the NE values will be pre-
sented, along with a solution to the HJB system. The second step is to construct the corresponding
NEs, by solving an associated Skorokhod problem.
2.5 NE and the HJB System
First,
Definition 2 (Action and waiting regions). Player i’s action region Ai is defined as
Ai :=
{
x ∈ RN ∣∣ dξi(x) 6= 0} ,
and her waiting region is Wi = RN \ Ai. Denote A−i = ∪j 6=iAj and W−i = ∩j 6=iWj.
Next, a simple heuristic conditional argument via the Dynamic Programming Principle leads to
the following HJB system.
Given Ai ∩ Aj = ∅, for any i 6= j,
6
(HJB-N)

min
{
−αwi + h
(
N−1
N
(
xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1
))
+ 12
(∑N
j=1w
i
xjxj
)
, 1− wi
xi
, 1 + wi
xi
}
= 0,
for any x ∈ W−i,
wi
xj
= 0, for any x ∈ Aj , for any j 6= i.
The derivation of (HJB-N) can be illustrated with the case of N = 2. In this case, if (x1, x2) ∈
A2, ∆ξ2∗ 6= 0. By the definition of NE, player one is not expected to suffer a loss as otherwise she
will have incentives to take actions. Therefore, w1(x1, x2) = w1(x1, x2 + ∆ξ2∗,+ −∆ξ2∗,−), letting
∆ξ2∗,± → 0, we have w1x2 = 0 in A2. If (x1, x2) ∈ W2, ∆ξ2∗ = 0, then the control problem for
player one becomes a classical single player control problem. Therefore, w1(x1, x2) satisfies
min
{
−αw1 + h
(
x1 − x2
2
)
+
1
2
(
w1x1x1 + w
1
x2x2
)
, 1− w1x1 , 1 + w1x1
}
= 0 in W2.
Here −αw1 +h
(
x1−x2
2
)
+ 12
(
w1x1x1 + w
1
x2x2
)
= 0 corresponds to ∆ξ1∗ = 0, 1−w1x1 = 0 corresponds
to ∆ξ1∗,+ > 0, and 1 + w1x1 = 0 corresponds to ∆ξ
1∗,− > 0. Finally, A1 ∩ A2 = ∅ ensures Eqn.
(2.8).
Based on the above HJB system, the following sufficient conditions for an NE can be established.
Theorem 3 (Verification theorem). For any i = 1, . . . , N , suppose ξi∗ ∈ U iN and the corresponding
wi(.) = J i(.;ξ∗) satisfies the following
(i) ξ∗ := (ξ1∗, . . . , ξN∗) ∈ SN ,
(ii)
min
−αwi + h
(
N − 1
N
(
xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1
))
+
1
2
N∑
j=1
wixjxj , 1− wixi , 1 + wixi
 = 0, (2.9)
for any x ∈ W−i, and
wixj (x) = 0,
for any x ∈ Aj.
(iii) (Transversality Condition.) lim supT→∞ E[e−αTwi(XT )] = 0,
(iv) wi(x) ∈ C2(W−i),
(v) wi
xj
(x) is bounded in W−i, for any j = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
(vi) there exists a convex function ui(x) ∈ C2(RN ) such that ui(x) = wi(x) on W−i,
(vii) for any ξi ∈ UN such that (ξ−i∗, ξi) ∈ SN , the controlled dynamic (X−i∗t , Xit) is inW−i P-a.s.
at any time t.
Then ξ∗ is an NE with value wi.
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Proof. Given any ξi ∈ U iN such that (ξ−i∗, ξi) ∈ SN , fixing the control (ξi,+t , ξi,−t ) such that
Xit = x
i +Bit + ξ
i,+
t − ξi,−t ,
Xj∗t = x
j +Bjt + ξ
j∗,+
t − ξj∗,−t , j 6= i.
Applying the Itô-Tanaka-Meyers formula (Theorem 14.3.2 in [13]) to e−αtui(X−i∗t , Xit) yields
E
[
e−αTui(X−i∗T , X
i
T )
]− ui(x1, x2, . . . , xN )
= E
∫ T
0
e−αt
1
2
N∑
j=1
uixjxj (X
−i∗
t , X
i
t)− αui(X−i∗t , Xit)
 dt

+ E
[∫
[0,T )
e−αt
(
(uixi(X
−i∗
t , X
i
t)dξ
i,+
t − uixi(X−i∗t , Xit)dξi,−t )
)]
+ E
 ∑
0≤t<T
e−αt
(
∆ui
(
X−i∗t , X
i
t
)−∇ui (X−i∗t , Xit) ·∆(X−i∗t , Xit))

+ E
∫ T
0
e−αt
 N∑
j=1
uixj (X
−i∗
t , X
i
t)dB
j
t
 .
Note that (vii) implies that with control (ξ−i∗, ξi) ∈ SN , (X−i∗t , Xit) ∈ W−i, P-a.s.. By conditions
(v) and (vi), ui
xj
is bounded onW−i for any 1 ≤ j ≤ N , therefore
∫ T
0 e
−αt
(∑N
j=1 u
i
xj
(X−i∗t , Xit)dB
j
t
)
is square integrable, hence a uniformly integrable martingale. Now conditions (ii), (iv), (v), and
(vi) suggest
e−αTE[wi(X−i∗T , X
i
T )] + E
∫ T
0
e−αt
[
h
(
N − 1
N
(
Xit −
∑
j 6=iX
j∗
t
N − 1
))
dt+ dξˇit
]
≥ wi(x1, . . . , xN ).
Taking T →∞, the transversality condition (iii) implies
wi
(
x1, . . . , xN
) ≤ J i (x1, . . . , xN ;ξ−i∗t , ξit) , (2.10)
for any ξi such that
(
ξ−i∗t , ξit
) ∈ SN .
The next step is to solve the HJB system, with a focus on a threshold-type solution. That is,
there exists a constant cN > 0 (to be determined) such that the action region Ai and the waiting
Wi of player i can be decomposed into
Ai =
{
E−i ∪ E+i
} ∩Qi, Wi = RN/Ai, (2.11)
where
E−i =
{(
x1, · · · , xN) ∈ RN ∣∣∣∣∣ xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1 ≤ −cN
}
,
E+i =
{(
x1, · · · , xN) ∈ RN ∣∣∣∣∣ xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1 ≥ cN
}
,
(2.12)
8
with the partition
Qi =
{
x ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣xk −
∑
j 6=k x
j
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ , for any k < i;∣∣∣∣∣xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣xk −
∑
j 6=k x
j
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ , for any k > i
}
.
Note the modification of the action region Ai by Qi is to avoid simultaneous jumps by multiple
players. By definition of Qi, in the event of multiple players in the “action region”, the player who is
the farthest away from the center intervenes first; in the event that multiple players have the same
largest distance to the center, the player with the biggest index intervenes.
Now it is easy to check that
• ∪Ni=1Qi = RN , Qi is a convex cone for any i = 1, . . . , N ,
• Wi 6= ∅, for any i = 1, . . . , N ,
• Ai ∩ Aj = 0, for all i 6= j.
Now, a candidate function wi(x) ∈ C2(W−i) should satisfy the following three properties: First,
wi(x) is symmetric on xi =
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 such that
wixi
(
x−i,
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1
)
= 0. (2.13)
Second, if 0 ≤ xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 < cN , then w
i(x) solves
αwi(x) = h
(
N − 1
N
(
xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1
))
+
1
2
N∑
j=1
wixj ,xj (x). (2.14)
Third, if xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 ≥ cN , then player i jumps by a distance of xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 − cN . Combined,
wi(x) = xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1 − cN + w
i
(
x−i,
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1 + cN
)
. (2.15)
The general solution satisfying both (2.14) and (2.13) is given by
wi(x) = B · cosh
(√
2(N − 1)α
N
(
xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1
))
+ pN
(
xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1
)
,
with
pN (x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αth
(
N − 1
N
(
x+
√
N
N − 1Bt
))
dt
]
. (2.16)
Here pN (x) is a particular solution to (2.14) and derived from the cost of “doing nothing”, and B is
constant yet to be determined.
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Now matching the values of wxi(x) and wxi,xi(x) along xi =
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 + cN determines cN and B:
cN is the unique positive solution to
1√
2(N−1)α
N
tanh
(
c
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
=
p′N (c)− 1
p′′N (c)
, (2.17)
and
B = − p
′′
N (cN )
2(N−1)α
N cosh
(
cN
√
2(N−1)α
N
) .
Finally, define
ui(x1, . . . , xN ) =

ui
(
x1, . . . ,
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 − cN , . . . , xN
)
− cN − xi +
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 , x ∈ E−i ,
−
p′′N (cN ) cosh
(√
2(N−1)α
N
(
xi−
∑
j 6=i xj
N−1
))
2(N−1)α
N
cosh
(
cN
√
2(N−1)α
N
) + pN
(
xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1
)
,
x ∈ {E+i ∪ E−i }c,
xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 − cN + ui
(
x1, . . . ,
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 + cN , . . . , x
N
)
, x ∈ E+i .
Then it is easy to check that ui ∈ C2(RN ) and the candidate solution wi satisfies (HJB-N) and
Theorem 3.
2.6 NE and the Skorokhod Problem (SP)
Given the NE solution to the N -player game, the corresponding NE can be constructed by finding
a solution to an associated SP on an unbounded polyhedron and with a constant oblique reflection
on each face.
First, define CW the common waiting regions of all players as
CW :=
{
x ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ < cN , for any i = 1, . . . , N
}
(2.18)
=
{
x ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣ nj · x > −cN
√
N
N − 1 , for j = 1, . . . , 2N
}
= ∩Ni=1(E−i ∪ E+i )c,
with the normal direction of each face given by
ni =
√
N − 1√
N
(
− 1
N − 1 , · · · ,−
1
N − 1 , 1,−
1
N − 1 , · · · ,−
1
N − 1
)
,
ni+N = −ni.
(2.19)
where 1 is in the ith position of
√
N
N−1ni. Note that CW is an unbounded polyhedron with all of
its 2N boundaries parallel to the direction (1, 1, · · · , 1).
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For j = 1, · · · , 2N , define the 2N faces of CW
Fj = {x ∈ ∂CW | nj · x = −cN}, (2.20)
and
di = (0, · · · , 1, · · · , 0), di+N = −di, i = 1, . . . , N, (2.21)
such that dj ·nj =
√
N−1√
N
, where 1 is in the ith position of di.
Now, the NE of (N-player) can be fully characterized by the solution to the SP with the data
(x, CW, (d1, · · · , d2N ), {B t}t≥0). (See Appendix A for more background materials.)
Theorem 4. There exits a unique strong solution to SP with the data (x, CW, (d1, · · · , d2N ), {B t}t≥0)
defined in (2.18) and (2.21). More precisely, the reflected process X ∗t with X ∗0 = x ∈ CW is defined
as
Xi∗t = x
i +Bit +
∫ t
0
1{X∗s∈Fi}dη
i(s)−
∫ t
0
1{X∗s∈Fi+N}dη
i(s), i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
where ηj(t) is a non-decreasing process with ηj(0) = 0. Moreover, if x /∈ Fk∩Fj for any k 6= j, k, j =
1, 2, · · · , 2N,
P(X ∗t /∈ Fk ∩ Fj for any k 6= j, t ≥ 0) = 1. (2.22)
The idea to prove Theorem 4 is to show first the existence of a weak solution to the SP and next
the uniqueness of the strong solution to the SP. Then according to Corollary 3.23 in Karatzas and
Shreve [32] and Proposition 1 in Engelbert [17], there exists a unique strong solution to the SP. The
existence of a weak solution to the SP is straightforward, following [14]. The uniqueness of a strong
solution is established by extending the result of Dupuis and Ishii [16] on a bounded polyhedron
to an unbounded one, via the localization technique. Moreover, the reflection vectors (d1, · · · , d2N )
satisfy the skew symmetry condition for the polyhedron CW according to [43], hence an additional
localization argument shows that (2.22) holds. The detailed proof is provided in Appendix A.
2.7 Extended Mapping to RN \ CW
Up to now the NE is derived when x ∈ CW. When x ∈ RN \ CW, the NE would be to jump
sequentially to some point xˆ ∈ ∂CW, and afterwards continues according to the SP with data
(xˆ, CW, (d1, · · · , d2N ), {B t}t≥0) where xˆ ∈ CW.
Algorithm 1 describes how players sequentially jump to CW. In order to show that this algorithm
is well defined, one needs to make sure that such jumps stop in finite steps or converge to a limit
point on xˆ ∈ ∂CW, and that the total distance of such sequential jumps is bounded. The detailed
argument is given in Appendix B, with the illustration of Figure 7.
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Algorithm 1 Policy: Sequential jumps when x /∈ CW.
1: procedure Sequential(x)
2: Define mapping,
i = pi(y) when y ∈ Ai,
∅ = pi(y) when y ∈ CW. (2.23)
3: xˆ ← x, k ← 0
4: while pi(xˆ) 6= ∅ do
5: λ∗ ← arg min
{
λ > 0
∣∣∣ xˆ + λepi(xˆ) ∈ ∂E−pi(xˆ) or xˆ − λepi(xˆ) ∈ ∂E+pi(xˆ)} . ej is a unit
vector in RN with jth component to be 1
6: if xˆ + λ∗epi(xˆ) ∈ ∂E−pi(xˆ) then
7: ν0 ← epi(xˆ)
8: else
9: ν0 ← −epi(xˆ)
10: xˆ ← xˆ + λ∗ν0 . Control of player pi(xˆ)
11: xk ← xˆ
12: k ← k + 1
13: return xˆ, {xk} . xˆ ∈ ∂CW
Note that this algorithm gives an -NE in finite steps. In the case that the starting point is in
the intersection of faces, a small perturbation in the algorithm and in the NE value will recover the
case of x ∈ CW. In summary,
Theorem 5 (NE for the N -player game). Under Assumption A1, a Markovian NE for game (N-
player) is given by
ξi∗,+t = ∆
i∗,+
0 +
∫ t
0
1{X∗s∈Fi}dη
i(s),
ξi∗,−t = ∆
i∗,−
0 +
∫ t
0
1{X∗s∈Fi+N}dη
i+N (s),
(2.24)
where CW is given in (2.18), X ∗t is the controlled dynamic with X ∗0 = xˆ = x+∆0∗,+−∆0∗,− ∈ CW,
with ηj(t) =
∫ t
0 1{X∗s∈Fj}dη
j(s) and ηj(0) = 0 (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2N), the jumps at time 0 are
∆i∗,+0 =
∑
k
1{xk∈Ai}
(
xik+1 − xik
)
+
,
∆i∗,−0 =
∑
k
1{xk∈Ai}
(
xik − xik+1
)
+
,
(2.25)
with {xk} the sequence of jumps prescribed by Algorithm 1.
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The corresponding NE value vi(x1, . . . , xN ) := J i(x1, . . . , xN ;ξ∗) is given by
vi(x1, . . . , xN ) =

vi
(
x1, . . . , xj−1,
∑
k 6=j x
k
N−1 − cN , xj+1, . . . , xN
)
,
x ∈ E−j ∩ Aj , for any j 6= i,
vi
(
x1, . . . ,
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 − cN , . . . , xN
)
− cN − xi +
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 ,
x ∈ E−i ∩W−i,
−
p′′N (cN ) cosh
(√
2(N−1)α
N
(
xi−
∑
j 6=i xj
N−1
))
2(N−1)α
N
cosh
(
cN
√
2(N−1)α
N
) + pN
(
xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1
)
,
x ∈ (E−i ∪ E+i )c ∩W−i,
xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 − cN + vi
(
x1, . . . ,
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1 + cN , . . . , x
N
)
,
x ∈ E+i ∩W−i,
vi
(
x1, . . . , xj−1,
∑
k 6=j x
k
N−1 + cN , x
j+1, . . . , xN
)
,
x ∈ E+j ∩ Aj , for any j 6= i.
(2.26)
Here E+i , E
−
i are given in (2.12), and Ai and Wi defined in (2.11).
Figure (2a) shows the region partition when N = 3. CW, the unbounded polytope, is surrounded
by the action regions Ai, i = 1, 2, 3. Figure (2b) shows the action region A1 of player one and the
common waiting region CW of all players.
(a) CW and Ai (i = 1, 2, 3) (b) A1 and W1,
a bird’s-eye view from (1, 1, 1)
to (0, 0, 0)
Figure 2: Region partition when N = 3
3 MFG for the Fuel Follower Problem
Take N identical, rational, and interchangeable players, whose initial positions are random in RN .
Let N →∞, the MFG for the fuel follower problem is to find a closed-loop control in feedback form
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of
v(x) = inf
(ξ+,ξ−)∈U∞
J(∞)(x; ξ+t , ξ
−
t )
= inf
(ξ+,ξ−)∈U∞
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
[
h(Xt −mt)dt+ dξˇt|X0− = x
]
,
such that dXt = dBt + dξ+t − dξ−t ,
X0− ∼ µ0−, m0− =
∫
xµ0−(dx),
(3.1)
where µt = limN→∞
∑N
i=1 1{Xit}
N is the distribution of Xt and mt = limN→∞
∑N
i=1X
i
t
N =
∫
xµt(dx) is
the mean position of the population at time t, with µ0− symmetric around m0−.
Note that one could write an alternative MFG formulation with
v˜(µ0−) := inf
(ξ+,ξ−)∈U∞
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
[
h(Xt −mt)dt+ dξˇt
]
.
v(x) defined in (3.1) can be viewed as v˜(µ0−|X0− = x) with X0− = x as some sample drawn from
µ0−. Clearly v˜(µ0−) can be solved by analyzing v(x) as v˜(µ0−) = Eµ0− [v(X0−)]. This connection is
also explored in Section 2.2.2 of [35].
The admissible control set for MFG is
U∞ =
{
(ξ+t , ξ
−
t ) | ξ+t and ξ−t are F (Xt−,mt−)t -progressively measurable, càdlàg, non-decreasing,
with E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtdξ+t
]
<∞, E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtdξ−t
]
<∞, ξ+0− = 0, ξ−0− = 0
}
.
3.1 NE Solution to the MFG
Definition 6 (NE to MFG (3.1)). An NE to the MFG (3.1) is a pair of Markovian control
(ξ∗,+t , ξ
∗,−
t )t≥0 and a mean function {m∗t }t≥0 such that
• v∗(x) = J(∞) (x; ξ∗,+, ξ∗,−|{µ∗t }t≥0) = minξ∈U∞ J(∞) (x; ξ+, ξ−|{µ∗t }t≥0),
• PX∗t = µ∗t , and m∗t =
∫
xPX∗t (dx) is the mean function of X
∗
t where X∗t is the controlled
dynamic under (ξ∗,+t , ξ
∗,−
t )t≥0.
v∗(x) is called the NE value of the MFG associated with ξ∗.
Theorem 7 (NE to MFG (3.1)). There exists an NE to the MFG (3.1),
ξ∗,+t = max
{
0, max
0≤u≤t
{m0− − x−Bu + ξ∗,−u − c}
}
,
ξ∗,−t = max
{
0, max
0≤u≤t
{x−m0− +Bu + ξ∗,+u − c}
}
,
(3.2)
and the corresponding NE value is
v∗(x) =

−p
′′
1 (c
√
2α) cosh(x
√
2α)
2α cosh(c
√
2α)
+ p1(x−m0−), m0− ≤ x ≤ m0− + c,
v(m0− + c) + (x−m0− − c), x ≥ m0− + c,
v(m0− − x), x < m0−,
(3.3)
where c is the solution to (2.4).
The proof consists of three steps.
14
Step 1: Stochastic control problem.
Take the M1 topology for the Skorokhod space D([0,∞)) with a Wasserstein distance W1([40, 19]).
Fix a mean field measure {µt}t≥0 ∈ P1(D([0,∞))), with mt =
∫
xµt(dx) and P1 the class of all
probability measures with finite moment of first order. Then (3.1) becomes the following time-
dependent and state-dependent singular control problem,
vˆ(s, x) = inf
ξ∈U∞
E
∫ ∞
s
e−α(t−s)
[
h(Xt −mt)dt+ dξ+t + dξ−t
]
such that dXt = dBt + dξ+t − dξ−t , Xs− = x, ms− = m.
(3.4)
The corresponding HJB equation for vˆ(s, x) is
max
{
αvˆ(s, x)− vˆt(s, x)− 1
2
vˆxx(s, x)− h(x−m),−1 + vˆx(s, x),−1− vˆx(s, x)
}
= 0. (3.5)
Note that (3.5) is a parabolic equation because of µt despite the infinite horizon. This is different
from the elliptic equation (2.3).
We will show that vˆ(s, x) in (3.4) is a viscosity solution to HJB equation (3.5).
First, under a fixed {µt}t≥0, the following dynamic programming principle holds.
Dynamic programming principle (DPP). For all (s, x) ∈ R+ × R,
vˆ(s, x) = inf
ξ∈U∞
E
[∫ θ
s
e−α(t−s)
(
h(Xt −mt)dt+ dξˇt
)
+ e−α(θ−s)v(θ,Xθ)
]
(3.6)
for any θ ∈ T and θ ≥ s, with T the set of all {F (Xt,mt)}t≥0-stopping times. Here, we adopt the
convention that e−αθ(ω) = 0 when θ(ω) = ∞. The proof of DPP (3.6) follows Guo and Pham [21]
by extending the state space from R to R+ × R.
Definition 8 (Viscosity solution). vˆ(t, x) is a continuous viscosity solution to (3.5) on [0,∞)×R
if
• Viscosity super-solution: for any (t0, x0) ∈ [0,∞)×R and for any function φ(t0, x0) such that
(t0, x0) is a local minimum of (vˆ − φ)(t, x) with vˆ(t0, x0) = φ(t0, x0),
max
{
αφ(t0, x0)− φt(t0, x0)− 1
2
φx,x(t0, x0)− h(x0 −m),−1 + φx(t0, x0),−1− φx(t0, x0)
}
≥ 0.
• Viscosity sub-solution: for any (t0, x0) ∈ [0,∞) × R and for any function φ(t0, x0) such that
(t0, x0) is a local maximum of (vˆ − φ)(t, x) with vˆ(t0, x0) = φ(t0, x0),
max
{
αφ(t0, x0)− φt(t0, x0)− 1
2
φx,x(t0, x0)− h(x0 −m),−1 + φx(t0, x0),−1− φx(t0, x0)
}
≤ 0.
Proposition 9. Assume that the value function vˆ(t, x) of (3.4) is continuous with respect to t.
Then vˆ(t, x) is a continuous viscosity solution of the HJB equation (3.5) on [s,∞)× R. Moreover,
vˆ(t, x) is convex and differentiable in x, and for any x, y ∈ R,
vˆ(s, x) ≤ vˆ(s, y) + |x− y|. (3.7)
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Proof. Since h is convex and the pay-off function E
[∫∞
s e
−α(t−s)h(Xt −mt)dt+ dξ+t + dξ−t
]
in prob-
lem (3.4) is linear in control (ξ+, ξ−), the value function vˆ(s, x) is convex in x. Since vˆ(s, x) is finite
and convex on (−∞,∞), it is continuous in x. Moreover, consider a special control,
ξ+t − ξ−t =
{
0, t = s,
y − x, t ≥ s, (3.8)
clearly vˆ(s, x) ≤ vˆ(s, y) + |y − x| .
We now prove that the value function is a viscosity solution of (3.5).
• Step A: Viscosity sub-solution.
For some (t0, x0) ∈ R+×R and φ ∈ C1,2(R+×R) such that vˆ(t0, x0) = φ(t0, x0) and φ(t0, x0) ≥
vˆ(t0, x0) for (t, x) ∈ B(t0, x0). That is, vˆ − φ has local maximum at (t0, x0). Consider the
following admissible control
ξ+t =
{
0, t = t0,
η1, t ≥ t0, (3.9)
ξ−t =
{
0, t = t0,
η2, t ≥ t0, (3.10)
where 0 ≤ η1, η2 ≤ . Define the exit time
τ = inf
{
t ≥ t0, Xt /∈ B¯(t0, x0)
}
. (3.11)
Notice that X has at most one jump at t = t0 and is continuous on [t0, t0 + τ). By the DPP,
φ(t0, x0) = vˆ(t0, x0) ≤ E
∫ t0+τ∧δ
t0
e−α(t−t0)
[
h(Xt −mt)dt+ dξ+t + dξ−t
]
+ E
[
e−α(τ∧δ)φ(t0 + τ ∧ δ,Xt0+τ∧δ)
]
.
(3.12)
By Itô’s lemma,
E[e−α(τ∧δ)φ(t0 + τ ∧ δ,Xt0+τ∧δ)]
= φ(t0, x0) + E
[∫ t0+τ∧δ
t0
e−α(t−t0)(−αφ+ φt + 1
2
φx,x)(t,Xt)dt
]
+ E
 ∑
t0≤t≤τ∧δ
e−αt(φ(t,Xt)− φ(t,Xt−))
 .
(3.13)
Combining (3.12) and (3.13),
E
[∫ t0+τ∧δ
t0
e−α(t−t0)(αφ− φt − 1
2
φx,x − h)(t,Xt)dt
]
−E
[∫ t0+τ∧δ
t0
e−α(t−t0)(dξ+t + dξ
−
t )
]
−E
 ∑
t0≤t≤τ∧δ
e−αt(φ(t,Xt)− φ(t,Xt−))
 ≤ 0.
(3.14)
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Now, setting η1 = η2 = 0 and letting δ → 0 leads to αφ− φt − 12φx,x − h ≤ 0.
Next, let η2 = 0, and note that ξ+t and Xt only jump at time t0 with a size η1, therefore
E
[∫ t0+τ∧δ
t0
e−α(t−t0)(αφ− φt − 1
2
φx,x − h)(t,Xt)dt
]
− η1 − φ(t0, x0 + η1) + φ(t0, x0) ≤ 0.
Now, taking δ → 0, dividing by η1, and letting η1 → 0 yields −1 − φx ≤ 0. Similarly,
−1 + φx ≤ 0. That is, φ is the sub-solution to (3.5), so that
max
{
αφ(t0, x0)− φt(t0, x0)− 1
2
φx,x(t0, x0)− h(x0 −m),−1− φx(t0, x0),−1 + φx(t0, x0)
}
≤ 0.
• Step B: Viscosity Super-solution.
This is established by a contradiction argument. Suppose otherwise, then there exists (t0, x0),
, δ > 0 φ ∈ C1,2(R+ × R) such that for any (t, x) ∈ B¯(t0, x0),{
αφ− 12φx,x − h(x−m)− φt ≤ −δ,
−1 + δ ≤ φx ≤ 1− δ.
(3.15)
Given any admissible control (ξ+, ξ−) ∈ U∞, consider an exit time τ = inf{t ≥ 0, Xt+t0 /∈
B¯(t0, x0)}, and apply Itô’s lemma to e−αtφ(t,Xt),
E
[
e−ατφ(t0 + τ, Xt0+τ)
]
= φ(t0, x0) + E
[∫ t0+τ
t0
e−α(t−t0)(−αφ+ φt + 1
2
φx,x)(t,Xt)dt
]
+ E
 ∑
t0≤t≤τ
e−αt(φ(t,Xt)− φ(t,Xt−))

+ E
[∫ t0+τ
t0
e−αtφ′(t,Xt)
((
dξ+t
)c
+
(
dξ−t
)c)]
.
Notice that for any t0 ≤ t ≤ t0 + τ, (t,Xt) ∈ B¯(t0, x0). By the Taylor expansion and
∆Xt = ∆ξ
+
t −∆ξ−t , clearly for any 0 ≤ t < τ:
φ(t,Xt)− φ(t,Xt−) = ∆Xt
∫ 1
0
φx(t,Xt + z∆Xt)dz
≥ (−1 + δ)(∆ξ+t + ∆ξ−t ). (3.16)
Thus,
E[e−ατφ(t0 + τ, Xt0+τ−)]
≥ φ(t0, x0) + E
[∫ t0+τ
t0
e−α(t−t0)(−h+ δ)(t,Xt)dt
]
+ (δ − 1)E
[∫ t0+τ−
t0
e−α(t−t0)(dξ+t + dξ
−
t )
]
= φ(t0, x0) + E
[∫ t0+τ
t0
e−α(t−t0)
(−h(Xt −mt)dt− dξ+t − dξ−t )]
+ E
[
e−ατ(∆ξ+t0+τ + ∆ξ
−
t0+τ
)] + δE[
∫ t0+τ
t0
e−αtdt
]
+ δE
[∫ t0+τ−
t0
e−α(t−t0)(dξ+t + dξ
−
t )
]
.
(3.17)
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By definition of τ, (t0 + τ−, Xt0+τ−) ∈ B¯(t0, x0) and (t0 + τ, Xt0+τ) is either on the
boundary ∂B(t0, x0) or out of B¯(t0, x0). However, there exists some random variable α ∈
[0, 1] such that,
xα = Xt0+τ− + α∆Xt0+τ
= Xt0+τ− + α(∆ξ
+
t0+τ
−∆ξ−t0+τ) ∈ ∂B(t0, x0).
Similar as in (3.16), we have
φ(t0 + τ, xα)− φ(t0 + τ, Xt0+τ−) ≥ α(−1 + δ)(∆ξ+t0+τ + ∆ξ−t0+τ). (3.18)
Notice that Xt0+τ = xα + (1− α)(∆ξ+t0+τ −∆ξ−t0+τ), and from (3.7),
vˆ(t0 + τ, xα) ≤ vˆ(t0 + τ, Xt0+τ) + (1− α)(∆ξ+t0+τ + ∆ξ−t0+τ). (3.19)
Recalling φ(t0 + τ, xα) ≤ vˆ(t0 + τ, xα), inequalities (3.18) and (3.19) imply
φ(t0 + τ, Xt0+τ−) ≤ vˆ(t0 + τ, Xt0+τ) + (1− αδ)(∆ξ+t0+τ + ∆ξ−t0+τ).
Plugging the above inequality into (3.17), by φ(t0, x0) = vˆ(t0, x0),
Ee−ατ
[∫ t0+τ
t0
(
h(Xt −mt)dt+ dξ+t + dξ−t
)
+ vˆ(t0 + τ, Xt0+τ)
]
≥ vˆ(t0, x0) + αδE
[
e−ατ(∆ξ+t0+τ + ∆ξ
−
t0+τ
)
]
+ δE
[∫ t0+τ
t0
e−αtdt
]
+ δE
[∫ t0+τ−
t0
e−α(t−t0)(dξ+t + dξ
−
t )
]
.
(3.20)
There exists a constant g0 > 0 such that for any (ξ+, ξ−) ∈ U∞,
αE
[
e−ατ(∆ξ+t0+τ + ∆ξ
−
t0+τ
)
]
+ E
[∫ t0+τ
t0
e−αtdt
]
+ E
[∫ t0+τ−
t0
e−α(t−t0)(dξ+t + dξ
−
t )
]
≥ g0.
Finally, taking the infimum over all admissible controls (ξ+, ξ−) ∈ U∞ in (3.20) suggests
vˆ(t0, x0) ≥ vˆ(t0, x0) + δg0, (3.21)
which is a contradiction.
The differentiability with respect to x can be proved using the convexity of the value function
vˆ(s, x) to (3.5). Since vˆ(s, x) is convex, the left and right derivatives with respect to x, vˆx−(t, x)
and vˆx+(t, x) exist for any t ≥ s and x ∈ R. Also, vˆx−(t, x) ≤ vˆx+(t, x) by convexity. We argue by
contradiction and suppose there exists x0 ∈ R and t0 ≥ 0 such that vˆx−(t0, x0) < vˆx+(t0, x0). Fix
some q in (vˆx−(t0, x0), vˆx+(t0, x0)) and consider the test function
φ(t, x) = vˆ(t0, x0) + q(x− x0)− 1
2
(x− x0)2 − 1
2
(t− t0)2,
with  > 0. Then (t0, x0) is a local minimum of (vˆ − φ)(t, x) since vˆx−(t0, x0) < q = φx(t0, x0) <
vˆx+(t0, x0) and φt(t0, x0) = 0. Hence φ is a viscosity super-solution by definition. That is,
max
{
αφ− φt − 1
2
φx,x − h(x0 −m),−1− φx,−1 + φx
}
≥ 0,
which leads to − 12 + h(x0 − m) − αφ(t0, x0) ≥ 0. Taking  > 0 sufficiently small leads to a
contradiction.
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Proposition 10 (Optimal Control). Assume A1 and assume that vˆt(t, x) is continuous with respect
to t, the optimal control to (3.4) under a fixed {µt}t≥0 ∈ P1(D([0,∞))) is of the form
dξˆt =

mt + ct − x, vˆx(t, x) = 1,
0, |vˆx(t, x)| < 1,
mt − ct − x, vˆx(t, x) = −1,
(3.22)
where t ≥ 0, mt =
∫
xµt(dx), and ct = inf{x | vˆx(t, x) = 1} −mt = − sup{x | vˆx(t, x) = −1}+mt.
Proof. By Proposition 9, vˆ(t, x) is convex and differentiable in x, hence for any fixed t ∈ [0,∞),
c1t := inf{x | vˆx(t, x) = 1} −mt and c2t := − sup{x | vˆx(t, x) = −1}+mt exist. By the symmetry of
Problem (3.1) under a fixed {mt}t≥0, vˆ(t,mt + δ) = vˆ(t,mt − δ) and vˆx(t,mt + δ) = −vˆx(t,mt − δ)
for any fixed t and any δ > 0, hence c1t = c2t , denoted as ct.
Because vˆ(t, x) is convex in x and continuously differentiable in x and t, one can apply the
generalized Itô’s formula to vˆ(t, x) with (3.22) and use a similar argument as the verification theorem
in [29] to obtain the optimality of (3.22).
Given the optimal control (3.22), define a mapping Γ1 : P1(D([0,∞)))→ D([0,∞)) such that
Γ1 ({µt}t≥0) = {ξˆ | {µt}t≥0}t≥0.
Step 2: Consistency.
Given Proposition 10 and a fixed flow {µt}t≥0, the optimal control (ξˆ+t , ξˆ−t ) to (3.5) is a bang-
bang type and the controlled process Xˆt is a reflected Brownian motion with two time-dependent
reflected boundaries mt + ct and mt− ct. mt + ct,mt− ct ∈ C([0,∞]) since vˆ(t, x) is continuous and
differentiable. By Theorem 2.6 in Burdzy, Kang, and Ramanan [9], there exists a unique solution,
Xˆt, to the SP with time varying domain {(t, x) |mt − ct ≤ x ≤ ct + mt} such that Xˆt is a càdàg
process. Furthermore, by Theorem 2.9 in Burdy, Chen, and Sylvester [8], the Kolmogorov forward
equation for µˆt can be described as

pt(t, x)− 12px,x(t, x) = 0, when |x−mt| < ct,
px(t, x) + 2(
∂mt
∂t +
∂ct
∂t )p(t, x) = 0, when x = mt + ct,
px(t, x)− 2(∂mt∂t − ∂ct∂t )p(t, x) = 0, when x = mt − ct,
(3.23)
with the initial distribution p(0, x) = µˆ0 ∈ P1(R), where
µˆ0(x) =

0, x < m0− − c0 or x > m0− + c0,
µ0−(x), |x−m0−| < c0,
µ0−(x) +
∫m0−−c0−
−∞ µ0−(dx), x = m0− − c0,
µ0−(x) +
∫∞
m0−+c0+ µ0−(dx), x = m0− + c0.
(3.24)
By Theorem 2.9 in [8], given mt + ct,mt − ct ∈ C([0,∞)), the Kolmogorov forward equation (3.23)
with the initial distribution p(0, x) := µˆ0(x) has a solution.
Step 3: Fixed point analysis. Denote µˆt as the distribution of Xˆt, obviously µˆt ∈ P1(D([0,∞)).
Consequently, define Γ2 : D([0,∞))→ P1(D([0,∞)) such that
Γ2
(
ξˆ(t, x|{µt}t≥0)
)
= {µˆt}t≥0.
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Now, define a mapping Γ : P1(D([0,∞))→ P1(D([0,∞)) such that
Γ({µt}t≥0) = Γ2 ◦ Γ1({µt}t≥0) = {µˆ}t≥0.
One can then update m′t, and have
dm′t = d
(∫
xp(t, dx)
)
(3.25)
=
[
1
2
∫
xpx,x(t, dx)
]
dt (3.26)
=
1
2
[xpx(t, x)|x=mt+ct − xpx(t, x)|x=mt−ct − p(t, x)|x=mt+ct + p(t, x)|x=mt−ct ]dt (3.27)
=
1
2
[(
−2
(
dmt
dt
+
dct
dt
)
x− 1
)
p(t, x)
∣∣∣∣
x=mt+ct
−
(
2
(
dmt
dt
− dct
dt
)
x− 1
)
p(t, x)
∣∣∣∣
x=mt−ct
]
dt (3.28)
(3.26) comes from (3.23), (3.27) is from integration by part, and (3.28) follows from the boundary
conditions. Since µ0− is symmetric around m0− and the optimal control (3.22) is an odd function
around mt for any t ≥ 0, the distribution p(t, x) is symmetric around m0− for any t ≥ 0.
(3.28) = −2
(
dmt
dt
mt +
dct
dt
ct
)
p(t,mt + ct)dt. (3.29)
Clearly mt = m0− is one solution to the fixed point equation (3.29). This fixed point to Γ is an NE
to the MFG (3.1) and the associated NE value is smooth in both x, t.
Remark 10.1. Note that solution mt (= m0−) is time independent and distribution independent.
Consequently v(t, x) is time independent and dctdt = 0. In fact, this time independent property of
the value function v(t, x) reduces the HJB equation (3.5) from a parabolic form to an elliptic one.
However, there might be time-dependent NE solution(s) with non-constant mean position {mt}t≥0
for Eqn. (3.29). We are unable to verify the existence/nonexistence of such solutions.
On a related note, if instead a stationary MFG (SMFG) is specified by replacing h(Xt − mt)
with h(Xt − limt→∞mt), the associated HJB equation (3.5) will also be elliptic. (See Appendix D
for more precise definition of the SMFG formulation.) In this case, one can use the same approach
to derive infinitely many NEs of the bang-bang type, with the controlled dynamics reflected at m− c
and m+ c for any constant m. Note however, the NE for the SMFG when m 6= m0− is not an NE
for the MFG (3.1).
4 Relation between the N-player game and the MFG
4.1 Convergence of Game Values
First, from Theorem 5, one can see, with the detailed proof given in Appendix C,
Proposition 11. Given cN the unique solution to (2.17) and c > 0 the unique solution to (2.4),
lim
N→∞
cN = c.
When h(x) = x2, cN is a decreasing function of N .
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Remark 11.1. It is no surprise from our earlier analysis that MFGs are different in nature from
N -player games. For instance, the MFG degenerates to a single-player game in the sense that its
NE is threshold-type bang-bang policy where the threshold is state independent while the NEs for the
N -player game are state dependent. Nevertheless, it is still somewhat unexpected to see the total
collapse of the MFG to the single player problem from the above proposition. This could be a result of
over aggregation in the MFG formulation: players become more anticipative when they are assumed
to be identical.
Next, denote vi(N) as the NE value of player i in the N -player game. By (2.26), when x1 = · · · =
xN = x,
vi(N)(x, x, · · · , x) =
−p′′N (cN )
2(N−1)α
N cosh
(
cN
√
2(N−1)α
N
) + pN (0). (4.1)
In particular, vi(N)(x, x, · · · , x) is independent of x. Moreover, from Proposition 11 and the smooth-
ness of PN (x), it is easy to verify that
limN→∞ p′′N (cN ) = p
′′
N (c),
limN→∞ 1
2(N−1)α
N
cosh
(
cN
√
2(N−1)α
N
) = 1
2α cosh(c
√
2α)
,
limN→∞ pN (0) = p1(0).
That is,
Proposition 12. For any x ∈ R, limN→∞ vi(N)(x, x, · · · , x) = v∗(x), where v∗ is the NE value of
player i in MFG (3.1) with µ0− = δ(x).
Figure 3 shows the convergence of vi(N)(x, x, · · · , x) with h = x2 and with different choices of α.
The MFG is illustrated by the dashed red horizontal line.
(a) α = 0.2 (b) α = 2 (c) α = 20
Figure 3: Convergence of vN with different discount factors
Remark 12.1. Figure 3 indicates that vN is an increasing function of N given any fixed decay
parameter α. This implies that when the number of players increases, it is more costly for players
to keep track of other players before making decisions. Meanwhile, v∗(x) being a decreasing function
of α indicates that the bigger the α, the less frequent players will intervene.
4.2 Approximating the N-player Game by the MFG
One can further show that the NE of MFG given in (3.2) is an -NE for the game in (N-player).
21
Definition 13 (-NE). For the game (N-player) with an initial distribution µ0−, a control vector
ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN ) is called its -NE, if for any i = 1, . . . , N and any control ξi′ such that
(
ξ−i, ξi′
)
=(
ξ1, . . . , ξi−1, ξi′ , ξi+1, . . . , ξN
)
∈ SN ,
E
[
J i(N) (X 0−;ξ)
]
≤ E
[
J i(N)
(
X 0−;
(
ξ−i, ξi
′))]
+ . (4.2)
Here Xi0− (i = 1, 2, · · · , N) are independent samples from distribution µ0−, and SN is defined in
(2.7).
Theorem 14 (-NE of the N -player game). Let ξ∗ be the NE of MFG given in (3.2), then it is an
-NE of the game (N-player), with  = O
(
1√
N
)
.
Proof. Given the game (N-player) with m0− =
∫
xµ0−(dx) ∈ R, assume that each player i in the
N -player game takes the control (ξi∗,+t , ξ
i∗,−
t ) according to the NE of the MFG such that
ξi∗,+t = max
{
0, max
0≤u≤t
{
m0− −Xi0− −Biu + ξi∗,−u − c
}}
,
ξi∗,−t = max
{
0, max
0≤u≤t
{
Xi0− −m0− +Biu + ξi∗,+u − c
}}
.
(4.3)
To see that ξ∗ =
(
ξ1∗, . . . , ξN∗
) ∈ SN , define
CWmfg =
{
x ∈ RN ∣∣ |xi −m0−| < c for i = 1, 2, · · · , N} ,
E−mfg,i =
{
x ∈ RN ∣∣ xi −m0− ≤ −c} ,
E+mfg,i =
{
x ∈ RN ∣∣ xi −m0− ≥ c} ,
with the partition
Qmfg,i =
{
x ∈ RN ∣∣ ∣∣xi −m0−∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣xk −m0−∣∣∣ , for any k < i;∣∣xi −m0−∣∣ > ∣∣∣xk −m0−∣∣∣ , for any k > i} .
Then the control in (4.3) corresponds to the action region Amfg,i =
{
E−mfg,i ∪ E+mfg,i
}
∩ Qmfg,i.
The independence of {B1t , . . . , BNt } and the continuity of {X1∗t , . . . , XN∗t }t>0 imply that for any
t ≥ 0 P (Πi=1,...,Ndξi∗t = 0) = 1.
Suppose that only one player, and without loss of generality, player one, deviates her control
ηt = (η
+
t , η
−
t ) from all the other players such that (ξ−i∗, η) ∈ SN . Let Xˆ1t be the new position of
player one under control (η+t , η
−
t ) with initial value X10−. Then
h
Xˆ1t − 1N
Xˆ1t + ∑
j=2,...,N
Xjt

= h
(
Xˆ1t −
1
N
Xˆ1t −
N − 1
N
m0−
)
+ h′
(
Xˆ1t −
1
N
Xˆ1t −
N − 1
N
m0−
)(∑
j=2,...,N X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
)
+
h′′(Ut)
2
(∑
j=2,...,N X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
)2
,
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where Ut is a process between
(
Xˆ1t − 1N Xˆ1t − N−1N m0−
)
and
(
Xˆ1t − 1N
(
Xˆ1t +
∑N
j=2X
j
t
))
. By
Assumption A1,
h
Xˆ1t − 1N
Xˆ1t + ∑
j=2,...,N
Xjt

≤ h
(
Xˆ1t −
1
N
Xˆ1t −
N − 1
N
m0−
)
+ h′
(
Xˆ1t −
1
N
Xˆ1t −
N − 1
N
m0−
)(∑N
j=2X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
)
+
K
2
(∑N
j=2X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
)2
≤ h
(
Xˆ1t −
1
N
Xˆ1t −
N − 1
N
m0−
)
+K
∣∣∣∣Xˆ1t − 1N Xˆ1t − N − 1N m0−
∣∣∣∣ ·
∣∣∣∣∣
∑N
j=2X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
∣∣∣∣∣
+
K
2
(∑N
j=2X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
)2
.
Similarly,
h
Xˆ1t − 1N
Xˆ1t + ∑
j=2,...,N
Xjt

≥ h
(
Xˆ1t −
1
N
Xˆ1t −
N − 1
N
m0−
)
−K
∣∣∣∣Xˆ1t − 1N Xˆ1t − N − 1N m0−
∣∣∣∣ ·
∣∣∣∣∣
∑N
j=2X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
∣∣∣∣∣
−K
2
(∑N
j=2X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
)2
.
Moreover, under the control (4.3), Xjt (j = 2, 3, · · · , N) are independent and identically distributed
and |Xjt −m0−| ≤ c a.s.. Therefore,
E
(∑N
j=2X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
)2
=
∑N
j=1 V ar(X
j
t )
N2
≤ c
2
N
= O(
1
N
),
and
E
∣∣∣∣∣
∑N
j=2X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
E(∑Nj=2Xjt
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
)21/2 = O( 1√
N
).
Therefore by the boundedness of Xjt (j = 2, 3, · · · , N) and by the Fubini Theorem,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
(∑N
j=2X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
)2
dt =
∫ ∞
0
e−αtE
(∑N
j=2X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
)2
dt = O
(
1
N
)
.
Similarly, when Xˆ1t is under the threshold-type control,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
∣∣∣∣Xˆ1t − 1N Xˆ1t − N − 1N m0−
∣∣∣∣ ·
∣∣∣∣∣
∑N
j=2X
j
t
N
− N − 1
N
m0−
∣∣∣∣∣ dt = O( 1√N ). (4.4)
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Now, to minimize the following payoff function
E
∫ ∞
s
e−αt
h
Xˆ1t − 1N Xˆ1t − 1N
N∑
j=2
Xjt
 dt+ dη+t + dη−t

= E
∫ ∞
s
e−αt
[
h
(
N − 1
N
Xˆ1t −
N − 1
N
m0−
)
dt+ dη+t + dη
−
t
]
+O
(
1√
N
)
. (4.5)
is equivalent to solving the original fuel follower problem (2.2) with a modified running cost
h(N−1N (· −m0−)). Since the value function for (2.2) is of a linear growth,
(4.5) ≥ E
∫ ∞
s
e−αt
[
h
(
N − 1
N
(Xˆ1t −m0−)
)
dt+ dη1∗,+t + dη
1∗,−
t
]
+O
(
1√
N
)
(4.6)
= E
[
v∗(X10−)
]
+O
(
1
N
)
+O
(
1√
N
)
(4.7)
where v∗(x) is defined in (3.3) and the expectation in (4.7) is with respect to the initial distribution
µ0−. The above analysis holds for any (η+t , η
−
t ) ∈ U iN such that (ξ−i∗, η) ∈ SN . Hence the conclusion.
5 Discussions
5.1 Multiple Explicit NEs for N = 2
When N = 2, h is symmetric with h(X1t −m(2)t ) = h(X2t −m(2)t ) = h
(
X1t−X2t
2
)
. This symmetry
simplifies significantly the solution structure and allows for the construction of multiple NEs. Indeed,
given the partition Qi in (2.13) for N = 2, Q1 = 0, Q2 = R2, one can write the NE and their
corresponding values explicitly.
ξ2∗t = (ξ
2∗,+
t , ξ
2∗,−
t )
=
(
max
{
0, max
0≤u≤t
{−x2 + x1 −B2u +B1u + ξ2∗,−u − c2}
}
,
max
{
0, max
0≤u≤t
{x2 − x1 +B2u −B1u + ξ2∗,+u − c2}
})
,
ξ1∗t =
(
ξ1∗,+t , ξ
1∗,−
t
)
= (0, 0),
(5.1)
where c2 > 0 is the unique positive solution of
1√
α
tanh
(√
αx
)
=
p′2(x)− 1
p′′2(x)
, (5.2)
with
p2(x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αth
(
x
2
+
√
2Bt
2
)
dt
]
.
And the NE values are
v2(x1, x2) =

v2(x1, x1 − c2)− c2 − x2 + x1, x2 − x1 ≤ −c2,
−p
′′
2 (c2) cosh(
√
α(x2−x1))
α cosh(c2
√
α)
+ p2(x
2 − x1), |x2 − x1| < c2,
x2 − x1 − c2 + v2(x1, x1 + c2), x2 − x1 ≥ c2,
(5.3)
24
and
v1(x1, x2) =

v1(x1, x1 + c2), x
1 − x2 ≤ −c2,
−p
′′
2 (c2) cosh(
√
α(x1−x2))
α cosh(c2
√
α)
+ p2(x
1 − x2), |x2 − x1| < c2,
v1(x1, x1 − c2), x1 − x2 ≥ c2.
(5.4)
There is in fact more than one NE. For instance, in addition to the above constructed NE, labeled
as Case 1, there are more NEs, including
Case 2: A1 = {(x1, x2) | x1 − x2 > c2 or x1 − x2 < −c2} and A2 = ∅,
Case 3: A1 = {(x1, x2) | x1 − x2 < −c2} and A2 = {(x1, x2) | x1 − x2 > c2},
Case 4: A1 = {(x1, x2) | x1 − x2 > c2} and A2 = {(x1, x2) | x1 − x2 < −c2}.
In Case 4, clearly
ξ1∗t = −max
{
0, max
0≤u≤t
{
0, x1 − x2 +B1u −B2u − ξ2∗u − c2
}}
,
ξ2∗t = −max
{
0, max
0≤u≤t
{
0, x2 − x1 +B2u −B1u − ξ1∗u − c2
}}
,
and the associated NE values are
v1(x1, x2) =

v1(x1, x1 + c2), x
1 − x2 ≤ −c2,
−p
′′
2 (c2) cosh(
√
α(x1−x2))
α cosh(c2
√
α)
+ p2(x
1 − x2), |x1 − x2| < c2,
x1 − x2 − c2 + v1(x2 + c2, x2), x1 − x2 ≥ c2,
and
v2(x1, x2) =

v2(x2 + c2, x
2), x2 − x1 ≤ −c2,
−p
′′
2 (c2) cosh(
√
α(x2−x1))
α cosh(c2
√
α)
+ p2(x
2 − x1), |x2 − x1| < c2,
x2 − x1 − c2 + v2(x1, x1 + c2), x2 − x1 ≥ c2.
Figure 4 illustrates all four NEs.
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Figure 4: Four NEs when N = 2
5.2 With Varying α
Proposition 15. When h(x) = x2 and α ≥ 2− 13 N−1N , cN increases with respect to α.
The proposition follows from simple calculations. Take h(x) = x2, p
′
N (x)−1
p′′N (x)
= x− αk2N2 with kN =
N
N−1 > 1. Rewrite fN as fN (x, α) =
√
kN√
2α
tanh
(√
2α√
kN
x
)
− x + k2Nα2 . Then ∂fN∂x = − tanh2
(√
2α√
kN
x
)
and ∂fN∂α =
x
2α
(
1− tanh2
(√
2α√
kN
x
))
−
√
kN
2α
√
2α
tanh
(√
2α√
kN
x
)
+
k2N
2 . One can verify that
∂fN
∂x < 0 for
any α and ∂fN∂α > 0 when α > 2
− 1
3k−1N . Hence
∂cN
∂α > 0 when α > 2
− 1
3k−1N follows from the chain
rule and from f(cN (α), α) = 0 for any N .
Figure 5, illustrates the convergence of cN with different discount factor α. The value of c is
shown in the red dash line.
(a) α = 0.2 (b) α = 2 (c) α = 20
Figure 5: Convergence of cN with different discount factors
Remark 15.1. Figure 5 indicates that cN is a decreasing function of N for any given discount
factor α. This implies that players will intervene more frequently with more players in the game.
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Meanwhile, c being a decreasing function of α indicates that the bigger the α, the less frequent players
will intervene. These are consistent with Figure 3.
It is worth noting that the analysis for α1 = · · · = αN = α can be easily extended to the
cases when αi’s are different. The exact forms of the NEs, however, may be more complicated, as
illustrated in the case of N = 2 below.
When N = 2, denote αi as the discount parameter for player i (i = 1, 2). Denote c
(i)
2 > 0 as the
unique solution of
1√
αi
tanh (
√
αix) =
p′2(x, αi)− 1
p′′2(x, αi)
, (5.5)
with
p2(x, αi) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αith
(
x
2
+
√
2Bt
2
)
dt
]
.
Corollary 15.1 (N = 2 with α1 6= α2). Assume A1 for game (N-player). If α2 > α1 > 2− 43 ,
then c(2)2 > c
(1)
2 . The following controls
ξ2∗,+t = 1{x2−x1<−c(2)2 }
(
−c(2)2 − x2 + x1
)
,
ξ2∗,−t = 1{x2−x1>c(2)2 }
(
c
(2)
2 − x2 + x1
)
,
and
ξ1∗,+t = max
{
0, max
0≤u≤t
{x2 +B2u + ξ2∗,+0 − ξ2∗,−0 − x1 −B1u + ξ1∗,−u − c(1)2 }
}
,
ξ1∗,−t = max
{
0, max
0≤u≤t
{−x2 −B2u − ξ2∗,+0 + ξ2∗,−0 + x1 +B1u + ξ1∗,+u − c(1)2 }
}
.
give a Markovian NE. The corresponding NE values are
v1(x1, x2) =

v1(x1, x1 + c
(2)
2 ) x
1 − x2 ≤ −c(2)2 ,
v1(x2 − c(1)2 , x2) + x2 − x1 − c(1)2 , −c(2)2 ≤ x1 − x2 ≤ −c(1)2 ,
−p
′′
2 (c
(1)
2 ) cosh(
√
α(x1−x2))
α cosh
(
c
(1)
2
√
α
) + p2(x1 − x2), |x1 − x2| ≤ c(1)2 ,
x1 − x2 − c(1)2 + v1(x2 + c(1)2 , x2), c(1)2 ≤ x1 − x2 ≤ c(2)2 ,
v1(x1, x1 − c(2)2 ) x1 − x2 ≥ c(2)2 ,
(5.6)
and
v2(x1, x2) =

v2(x1, x1 − c(2)2 )+x1 − x2 − c(2)2 , x2 − x1 ≤ −c(2)2 ,
v2(x2 + c
(1)
2 , x
2) −c(2)2 ≤ x2 − x1 ≤ −c(1)2 ,
−p
′′
2 (c
(1)
2 ) cosh(
√
α(x2−x1))
α cosh
(
c
(1)
2
√
α
) + p2(x2 − x1), |x2 − x1| ≤ c(1)2 ,
v2(x2 − c(1)2 , x2) c(1)2 ≤ x2 − x1 ≤ c(2)2 ,
x2 − x1 − c(2)2 + v2(x1, x1 + c(2)2 ), x2 − x1 ≥ c(2)2 .
(5.7)
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Figure 6 shows the NE defined in Corollary 15.1.
Figure 6: N=2 with different α values
Acknowledgments. The authors are in debt to the referee and the AE for their invaluable sug-
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Appendix A: the Skorokhod Problem (SP)
First, some notation for a general polyhedron G.
Take a fixed integer l (l ≥ 1), let J = {1, 2, · · · , l}. Given an l−dimensional vector b =
(b1, · · · , bl) and N -dimensional unit vectors {nj , j ∈ J}, a polyhedron G is defined by
G = {x ∈ RN | nj · x > bj for any j ∈ J}.
Assume the faces Fj = {x ∈ G¯ | nj · x = bj} (j ∈ J ) are of dimension N − 1.
Next, take another set of N−dimensional vectors {dj , j ∈ J}, we can define the SP problem on
a polyhedron with oblique reflections (d1 , · · · , dl), in both the strong sense and the weak sense.
Definition 16 (Strong solution to SP). Given a polyhedron G, a vector field (d1 , · · · , dl), and
x ∈ G. Given an N -dimensional Brownian motion {B t}t≥0 on the probability space (Ω,F ,Px), a
strong solution to the SP with the data (x,G, (d1 , · · · , dl), {Bt}t≥0) is an FBt -adapted process X t
such that
(a) X t = x +B t + ηtD, with D =
d1· · ·
dl
 ∈ Rl×N ,
(b) X t has a continuous path in G,
(c) X t ∈ G, for any t ≥ 0 a.s.,
(d) ηj0 = 0, η
j
t is continuous and nondecreasing, η
j
t increases only when X t is on the face Fj. That
is,
ηjt =
∫ t
0
1{Xs∈∂Fj}dη
j
s,
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(e) the reflection direction γ(x) := dj , if x ∈ Fj for j ∈ J .
Definition 17 (Weak solution to SP). Given a polyhedron G, a vector field (d1 , · · · , dl), and x ∈ G¯.
A weak solution to the SP with the data (x,G, (d1 , · · · , dl)) is an adapted N -dimensional process X t
defined on some probability space (Ω,F ,Px) such that
(a) X t = W t + ηtD, with D =
d1· · ·
dl
 ∈ Rl×N and W an N -dimensional Brownian motion under
Px, with X 0 = x, Px-a.s.,
(b) X t has a continuous path in G, Px-a.s.,
(c) ηj0 = 0, η
j
t is continuous and nondecreasing, ηj(t) can increase only when X t is on the face
Fj. That is,
ηjt =
∫ t
0
1{Xs∈∂Fj}dη
j
s,
(d) the reflection direction γ(x) := dj , if x ∈ Fj for j ∈ J .
Now the proof of Theorem 4 follows from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 18 (Existence of the weak solution to SP). Fix x ∈ CW. There exists a weak solution to
the SP with the data (CW, (d1, · · · , d2N ),x) with dj (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2N) defined in (2.21) and CW
defined in (2.18). It is a semimartingale reflected Brownian motion (SRBM) starting from x.
In fact, this weak solution is unique in a weak sense, see [14].
Proof of Lemma 18. Following the notation in [14], define the maximal set to characterize the points
on ∂CW as follows. Take J = {1, 2, · · · , 2N} the index set of the 2N faces of CW. For each
∅ 6= K ⊂ J, define FK = ∩j∈KFj . Let F∅ = CW. A set K ⊂ J is maximal if K 6= ∅, FK 6= ∅, and
FK 6= FK˜ for any K˜ ⊃ K such that K˜ 6= K. Now, it suffices to show that for each maximal K ⊂ J ,
(S.a) there is a positive linear combination d =
∑
j∈K ajdj (aj > 0, ∀j ∈ K) of the {dj , j ∈ K}
such that nj · d > 0 for any j ∈K ;
(S.b) there is a positive linear combination n =
∑
j∈K cjnj (cj > 0, ∀j ∈ K) of the {nj , j ∈ K}
such that dj ·n > 0 for any j ∈K .
Let us first show that for any maximal K , |K | ≤ N − 1. To see this claim, denote
Nmat :=

n1
n2
...
n2N
 =
√
N − 1√
N

1 − 1N−1 − 1N−1 . . . − 1N−1
− 1N−1 1 − 1N−1 . . . − 1N−1
...
...
...
. . .
...
− 1N−1 − 1N−1 − 1N−1 . . . 1
−1 1N−1 1N−1 . . . 1N−1
1
N−1 −1 1N−1 . . . 1N−1
...
...
...
. . .
...
1
N−1
1
N−1
1
N−1 . . . −1

∈ R2N×N .
It follows from some calculations that det(Nmat) = N − 1, implying that for any K ⊂ J with
|K | = N , ∩Fj∈K = ∅. Moreover, for any maximal K, |K | ≤ N − 1. Now checking the conditions
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(S.a) and (S.b) for any maximal K reduces to checking these conditions for the maximal K with
|K | = N − 1.
Note that for any i = 1, · · · , N , Fi and FN+i are parallel faces such that Fi ∩ FN+i = ∅, there
is no maximal K for which both i ∈K and N + i ∈K . Thus, take any K = {i1, · · · , iN−1}, where
ik ∈ {k,N + k} for k = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1. Denote m as the number of indexes in K which is strictly
smaller than N , then N − 1−m is the number of indexes in K that are greater than N .
To check (S.a), define n =
∑N−1
k=1 nik , then for any k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N − 1},
n · dik =
√
N − 1√
N
[
1 +
1
N − 1
[
1(ik≤N)(N − 2m) + 1(ik>N)(−N+2m+ 2)
]]
> 0.
To check (S.b), define d =
∑N−1
k=1 dik , then for any k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N − 1},
d ·nik =
√
N − 1√
N
[
1 +
1
N − 1
[
1(ik≤N)(N − 2m) + 1(ik>N)(−N+2m+ 2)
]]
> 0.
Next, the uniqueness of solution in the strong sense is established by the localization technique.
That is, construct a sequence of bounded region Wk (k ∈ N+) such that
W1 ⊂ W2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ CW,
where Wk satisfies the condition in [16]. Then define a sequence of stopping times associated with
Wk (k ∈ N+) and extend the strong uniqueness result on bounded regions in [16].
Lemma 19 (Uniqueness of the strong solution to SP). Given a probability space (Ω,F ,P), suppose
there are two strong solutions X ∗t and X ∗′t to the SP with the data (x, CW, (d1, · · · , d2N ), {B t}t≥0)
with di (i = 1 · · · , 2N) defined in (2.21). Then
Px
(
X ∗t = X
∗′
t ; 0 ≤ t <∞
)
= 1.
Proof of Lemma 19. First, the uniqueness on a bounded region. To this end, define the bounded
regionWk = CW∩
{
x
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∑Ni=1 xi∣∣∣ < k} for k ∈ N+. Clearly,Wk ⊆ Wk+1 ⊆ CW and CW = ∪kWk.
Define the boundaries of Wk as
∂Wk = ∪2Ni=1F (k)i ∪ F (k)2N+1 ∪ F (k)2N+2,
where F (k)i = Fi ∩ Wk for i = 1, . . . , 2N , F (k)2N+1 = Wk ∩ {x |
∑N
i=1 xi = k}, and F (k)2N+2 = Wk ∩
{x |∑Ni=1 xi = −k}. Define the reflection direction γ(l)(·) on ∂Wk as
γ(k)(x) =

d2N+1 = n2N+1 =
1√
N
(−1,−1, . . . ,−1), x ∈ F (k)2N+1,
d2N+2 = n2N+2 =
1√
N
(1, 1, . . . , 1), x ∈ F (k)2N+2,
di, x ∈ F (k)i , for i = 1, 2, · · · , 2N.
(5.8)
For x ∈ ∂Wk, define Ik(x) :=
{
i : x ∈ F (k)i
}
as the index set of x. Following [16], we will show
that, for each x ∈ ∂Wk, there exists bi ≥ 0, i ∈ Ik(x), such that
bidi ·ni >
∑
j∈Ik(x)\{i}
bj |dj ·ni|. (S.c)
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Define bi = 1 for any i = 1, 2, · · · , 2N + 2. It is sufficient to verify (S.c) for x ∈ ∂Wk such that
|Ik(x)| = N . In this case, either 2N + 1 ∈ Ik(x) or 2N + 2 ∈ Ik(x). Take any i0 ∈ Ik(x) \ {2N +
1, 2N + 2},
|ni0 · di0 | =
√
N − 1√
N
,
|ni0 · dj | =
√
N − 1√
N
1
N − 1 , for j ∈ Ik(x) \ {2N + 1, 2N + 2, i0},
|ni0 · dj | = 0, for j ∈ {2N + 1, 2N + 2}.
Hence (S.c) holds with di0 ·ni0 =
√
N−1√
N
and
∑
j∈Ik(x)\{i0} |dj ·ni0 | =
√
N−1√
N
N−2
N−1 . By [16], there exists
a unique strong solution (X kt , ηk)t≥0 to the SP with the data (x,Wk, (d1, · · · , d2N+2), {B t}t≥0) such
that x ∈ Wk.
Now, let (X k′t , ηk′) be the strong solution to the SP with the data (x′,Wk, (d1, · · · , d2N+2), {B ′t}t≥0).
Then by [16], there exists a constant Ck <∞ such that for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
E
(
sup
0≤s≤t
‖X ks −X k′s |2
)
≤ Ck
{
‖x − x′‖2 +
∫ t
0
E
(
sup
0≤u≤s
‖Bs −B ′s‖2
)
ds
}
. (5.9)
To finish the proof, now suppose that there are two strong solutions (X ∗t , η∗)t≥0 and (X ∗′t , η∗′)t≥0
to the SP with the data (x, CW, (d1, · · · , d2N ), {B t}t≥0), with di (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2N) defined in (2.21)
and X ∗0 = X ∗′0 = x ∈ CW. Suppose there exists M := M(x) such that x ∈ Wk for k ≥ M . Define
τk = inf{t : X ∗t ∈ F (k)2N+1 ∪ F (k)2N+2} and τ ′k = inf{t : X ∗′t ∈ F (k)2N+1 ∪ F (k)2N+2}. Then the uniqueness of
the strong solution to SP with the data (x,Wk, γ(k), {B t}t≥0) implies that for k ≥M ,
Px
(
X ∗t = X
∗′
t , t ≤ τk
)
= 1, (5.10)
Px
(
τk = τ
′
k
)
= 1.
By the continuity of the probability measure,
Px
(
X ∗t = X
∗
t
′, t ≤ τk, k →∞
)
= lim
k→∞
Px
(
X ∗t = X
∗′
t , t ≤ τk
)
= 1. (5.11)
Now it remains to show limk→∞ τk =∞ a.s.. Suppose otherwise, then there exists τ∗ = τ∗(ω) <∞
such that limk→∞ τk = τ∗ pathwise. Therefore,
Px
( ∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
Xi∗τ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ =∞
)
= Px
( ∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
xi +Biτ∗ + η
i∗
τ∗ − ηN+i∗τ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ =∞
)
= 1,
which implies, from the bounded variation property of {η∗}t≥0, Px
(∣∣∣∑Ni=1Biτ∗∣∣∣ =∞) = 1. This
contradicts with the property of Brownian motion, thus limk→∞ τk =∞ a.s..
Appendix B: Well-posedness of Algorithm 1
If x = (x1, · · · , xN ) /∈ CW, then there exists an i such that x ∈ Ai. For any k > 1, denote the point
after the k-th jump as xk = (x1k, . . . , x
N
k ). In step k + 1, if xk ∈ Ai, player i will apply a minimal
push to reach the boundary ∂E−i ∪ ∂E+i .
If the jumps do not stop in finite steps, an argument by contradiction will show that they
converge to xˆ ∈ ∂CW. Let us first show that {xk}k≥1 converges. At each step k ≥ 1, denote
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x
(1)
k ≤ · · · ≤ x(N)k as the ordered points of x1k, . . . , xNk . At each step k, only the player with position
x
(1)
k or x
(N)
k will jump. Therefore {x(1)k }k≥1 is a non-decreasing sequence with an upper bound
maxi≤N xi. Hence the limit exists, denoted as x
(1)
∗ . Similarly, the bounded non-increasing sequence
x
(N)
k has a limit, denoted as x
(N)
∗ . Then by the sandwich argument, {xk}k≥1 converges.
Next, denote the distance dik = |xik−
∑
i 6=j x
j
k
N−1 |. By definition of Ai, the player with the biggest dik
will jump in step k+ 1. Suppose xˆ = limk→∞xk /∈ ∂CW, then there exists an m ∈ {1, . . . , N} such
that xˆ ∈ Am. Denote the distance ∆ = |xˆm−
∑
j 6=m xˆ
j
N−1 |−cN = maxi=1,2,··· ,N{|xˆi−
∑
j 6=i xˆ
j
N−1 |}−cN > 0.
Given  > 0 so that  < ∆8N and CW ∩ B(xˆ) = ∅, there exists a sufficiently large K > 0 such that
for any k′ > K, xk′ ∈ B(xˆ). That is,
∑N
i=1 |xik′ − xˆi|2 ≤ 2. By the triangle inequality,∣∣∣∣∣xmk′ −
∑
j 6=m x
j
k′
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣− cN ≥
∣∣∣∣∣xˆm −
∑
j 6=m xˆ
j
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣− cN −
∣∣∣∣∣
(
xmk′ −
∑
j 6=m x
j
k′
N − 1
)
−
(
xˆm −
∑
j 6=m xˆ
j
N − 1
)∣∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣∣xˆm −
∑
j 6=m xˆ
j
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣− cN − |xmk′ − xˆm| − 1N − 1 ∑
j 6=m
∣∣∣xjk′ − xˆj∣∣∣
≥ ∆− 2 ≥ 4N − 1
4N
∆ > 2.
Thus in step k′ + 1, the player should jump at a minimum distance of 4N−14N ∆, which is strictly
greater than 2 when N > 1. Therefore xk′+1 /∈ B(xˆ), which is a contradiction. Hence xˆ =
limk→∞xk ∈ ∂CW.
To see that the total distance of sequential jumps is bounded, rewrite dik in the form of d
i
k =
N−1
N
∣∣xik − x¯k∣∣, where x¯k = ∑Nj=1 xjkN . Clearly, in step k + 1, either the player with value x(1)k or the
player with value x(N)k will jump. By the monotonicity property of {x(N)k }k and {x(1)k }k, the total
distance of jumps is bounded pointwise.
Figure 7: Sequential jumps at time 0
32
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. First, denote for N ≥ 2,
fN (x) =
1√
2(N−1)α
N
tanh
(
x
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
− p
′
N (x)− 1
p′′N (x)
,
and
f1(x) =
1√
2α
tanh
(
x
√
2α
)
− p
′
1(x)− 1
p′′1(x)
.
Then there exists a unique c > 0 such that f1(c) = 0 and there exists a unique cN > 0 such that
fN (cN ) = 0 for N ≥ 2. Denote m1(x) = p
′
1(x)−1
p′′1 (x)
and mN (x) =
p′N (x)−1
p′′N (x)
. There exists c˜N > 0 such
that m′N (x) ≥ 1 on (c˜N ,∞) with 0 < c˜N < cN < ∞ for N ≥ 2. And there exists c˜ > 0 such that
m′1(x) ≥ 1 on (c˜,∞) with 0 < c˜ < c <∞. Now 0 < tanh′(x) = 1− tanh2(x) < 1 for any x ∈ (0,∞),
therefore f ′N (x) < 0 on (cN ,∞) for N ≥ 2 and f ′1(x) < 0 on (c,∞). Since fN converges to f1
pointwise, for any  > 0, there exists an N such that for any n ≥ N, |fn(c)| = |fn(c)− f1(c)| ≤ .
By the uniqueness of the zeros for each function fN , cN → c as N →∞.
Secondly, when h = x2, fN reduces to
fN (x) =
1√
2(N−1)α
N
tanh
(√
2(N − 1)α
N
x
)
− x+ α
2
(
N−1
N
)2 ,
with fN (cN ) = 0. Therefore, ∂cN∂N = −∂fN∂N · 1∂fN
∂cN
with ∂fN∂cN = − tanh
2
(√
2(N−1)α
N x
)
< 0, the
conclusion follows after simple computations.
Appendix D: Stationary Mean Field Games (SMFGs)
SMFG for (3.1). An SMFG version of (3.1) can be formulated as the follows.
v∞(x) = inf
(ξ+,ξ−)∈U∞
J(∞)(x; ξ+t , ξ
−
t )
= inf
(ξ+,ξ−)∈U∞
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
[
h(Xt −m∞)dt+ dξi,+t + dξi,−t
∣∣∣X0− = x] ,
such that Xt = Bt + ξ+t − ξ−t + x,
µ0− = µ, X0− ∼ µ, m0− = m =
∫
xµ0−(dx),
(5.12)
where
• µt = limN→∞
∑N
i=1 δXit
N is the distribution of Xt,
• mt = limN→∞
∑N
i=1X
i
t
N is the mean position of the population at time t,
• m∞ = limt→∞mt is the limiting mean position if it exists.
The admissible control set for SMFG is U∞ as defined in Section 3. SMFG is a game with the
long-term mean-field aggregation.
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Definition 20 (NE to SMFG (5.12)). An NE to the SMFG (5.12) is a pair of Markovian control
(ξ∗,+t , ξ
∗,−
t )t≥0 and a limiting mean position m∗ such that
• v∗(x) = J(∞) (x; ξ∗,+, ξ∗,−|m∗) = minξ∈U∞ J(∞) (x; ξ+, ξ−|m∗),
• m∗ = limt→∞ E[X∗t ] where X∗t is the controlled dynamic under (ξ∗,+t , ξ∗,−t )t≥0.
v∗(x) is called the NE value of the SMFG associated with ξ∗.
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